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Remittances and Migration Intentions of the Left-Behind* 
 
Migration and the consequent flow of remittances are like a double-edged sword; while 
keeping many out of poverty, they can also result in further brain drain and demographic 
imbalance for the country. Using a large household survey data from Moldova and employing 
simultaneous equations model we show that there exists a dual causality between receipt of 
remittances by non-migrants and their migration intentions. Moreover, we add a novel 
element to the empirical literature by being the first to be able to specify the mechanism 
behind the link between remittances and migration. We find evidence that remittances not 
only relieve credit constraints in the home country but also act as a signalling device of 
success in the host country. These results provide a fresh outlook on the role of remittances 
in shaping migration flows in the migrant sending countries. 
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1.   Introduction 
There is an on-going debate about the positive and negative implications of migrant 
remittances. While the proponents of remittances argue that such transfers promote 
economic development in receiving countries by providing a mechanism to share 
risks, reduce poverty and improve inequality, critics emphasise the unproductive 
nature of such transfers. They argue that remittances fail to enhance development in 
migrant- sending countries because they are not spent on investment goods but, 
rather, used for consumption purposes, which breeds dependency. In a similar 
context, a recent strand of literature has highlighted the role of these transfers in 
furthering migration of other non-migrant individuals in the home country. In 
particular, it shows that remittances serve as signals of financial success of the 
remitters and their well-being in the host country and, in-turn, encourage non-
migrants to move abroad1 (Van Dalen et al 2005a, 2005b; Dimova and Woolf 2009; 
Leeves 2009). This evidence stands in stark contrast with the tenets of New 
Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) approach, according to which, remittances 
should reduce future emigration because they help households overcome credit 
constraints and provide insurance against negative income shocks at home (Taylor, 
2002). This debate provides an interesting context for the study of remittances as not 
only a result of but also a cause for further migration.  
 
This paper investigates the impact of remittances on subsequent migration by 
exploring the link between remittance receiving households and the migration 
intentions of non-migrant individuals residing in such households. In contrast to the 
earlier work, it has been argued that the role of remittances in perpetuating migration 
intentions of non-migrants differs between migrant and non-migrant households.. 
Migrant households are defined as those households that receive remittances from 
family members. Non-migrant households are those that receive remittances from 
friends/acquaintances or ex-household members. Previous research has shown that in 
countries with strong migration networks it is common for non-migrant households to 
receive remittances too (Cox and Ureta 2003; Leeves 2009). For instance, as family 
members are the remitters for almost all migrant households there is a high 
probability that the strength of the ties between the two determine the migration 
                                                              
1 This is also known as the concept of chain migration or in other words remittance induced migration wherein the remittances 
sent by current remitters are a source of encouragement for those in the home country to emigrate. 
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intentions of individuals from such households. 2  By contrast, because family 
members are not the remitters for non-migrant households, it is reasonable to assume 
that it is the signalling property of remittances that encourages migration intentions of 
individuals in such households. Differentiating between these mechanisms is 
important as the potential policy implications are likely to vary with the nature of the 
link between remittances and migration intentions. For instance, if remittances have a 
signalling property, it indicates greater comparative well-being in the host country 
vis--vis the home country, in which case policies that aim to create more 
opportunities in the home country will be necessary to weaken such incentives. On 
the other hand, if subsequent migration is a result of family ties, it would imply a 
relatively smaller flow of remittances in the future, e.g. when families reunite in the 
host country. This may then weaken the argument that incoming remittance transfers 
partly compensate for the loss of human capital due to migration.  
  
In addition to this, the research also argues that the past empirical analysis has ignored 
the possibility of intent induced remittances, e.g. individuals who have prior 
intentions to migrate may ask migrants (either their family or friends) who are abroad 
to send them money to cover their migration costs. Ignoring this dimension of the 
relationship is likely to underestimate the effects of remittances on subsequent 
migration. 
 
The paper attempts to fill these gaps in the literature by analysing a simultaneous 
relationship between the receipt of remittances and subsequent migration of non-
migrants using data from Moldova. Policy makers implicitly assume that remittances 
benefit the country of origin and base these possible benefits to underpin their 
migration policy. Macroeconomic research shows that remittances may not be 
beneficial for the countries as a whole (Chami et al, 2005). Although the current 
analysis is microeconomic oriented, it reflects upon an important consequence of 
remittances that may explain their negative macroeconomic effect. Besides, it is also 
argued that countries with strong migration networks have lower costs of migration 
                                                              
2 Van Dalen et al (2005a) show that in Egypt and Turkey, migration intentions are determined by the 
strength of family ties. They run different regressions with and without emigrant variables. While the 
latter regression results show that remittances have a positive influence on migration intentions, the use 
of emigrant variables completely neutralise the effect of remittances on intentions. This suggests that 
emigration intentions are determined by the strength of ties between the migrant and the sending 
household. 
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(Boyd 1989) and the information conveyed in remittance receipts to the benefits of 
migration will be more reliable than other sources such as newspapers, agencies that 
help in moving abroad etc (Bauer, Epstein and Gang, 2007). Furthermore, unlike most 
emigration countries, migration from Moldova is more of a temporary nature. For 
example, amongst the pool of migrants 60 percent migrate to Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), primarily to Russsia, most of them on temporary contracts 
to work in the construction industry (Luecke et al 2007). Other evidence based on the 
surveys realised by the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) also show that 
most Moldovans planned to emigrate for a short period only. As highlighted by the 
existing literature, the form of migration plays a key role on the impact of remittances 
as those who plan to return to the home country have a different objective of 
migration than those who wish to settle permanently in the host country (Dustman and 
Mestres, 2006). 
 
A preliminary breakdown of migration intentions by receipt of remittances shows that 
the intention to migrate increases with the householdÕs remittance-status i.e. only 
about 6 percent of non-migrants from non-recipient households express intentions to 
migrate compared to 10 percent of non-migrants from remittance receiving 
households (see Table 1). Table 1 also shows that the probability to receive 
remittances increases if the individual has intentions to migrate in the near future  ̶̶  25 
percent of individuals with plans to go abroad in the future receive remittances 
compared to only 15 percent without any plans.  
 
Table 1:  Average emigration intentions by household receiving remittances & 
average receipt of remittances by migration intentionsÕ 
 
Individuals living 





migrate abroad in 






0.103 Yes 0.245 
Did not receive 0.059 No 0.151 
 
Our estimation results show that in Moldova, remittances and migration intentions 
share a reciprocal relationship. In particular, we find that remittances have a 
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signalling effect of a positive chance of success in the destination country. We also 
show that transfers alleviate the liquidity constraints of the recipients in the home 
country, which then triggers further migration. These results have potential 
implications for policies in the home country that could help in the weakening, if not 
eliminating, the phenomenon of chain migration.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2, provides a review of previous 
literature while Section 3 presents the conceptual framework and details the empirical 
methodology. Section 4 explains the data and the main variables used in the analysis. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical results and finally Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
The analysis of remittances as an important stimulant of migration is noteworthy for 
the following reasons. As remittances arise primarily out of self-enforcing agreements 
between individuals, they are of a more resilient nature and can have an enduring 
impact on further migration compared to the effects of international migration policies 
that are more transitory and are likely to be a response to a political agenda. Also, as 
remittances are a result of successful migration of family members, relatives or 
friends, the information content in these transfers about comparative opportunities and 
standards of living in the host country is far more credible. Hence, it is likely to 
translate into action much more quickly than general information about labour market 
disparities from other sources such as migration recruitment agencies, social media 
etc.  
 
Notwithstanding these interesting characteristics of remittances, most of the literature 
on remittances has either disregarded the causal effects of remittances on future 
migration based on the NELM perspective or has not explored this aspect due to data 
limitations. There are indeed a few exceptions. For instance, Stark and Wang (2002) 
were the first to model the impact of migrantsÕ transfers to non-migrants in the home 
country. They advance the idea of Ôstrategic remittancesÕ and explain the role of 
remittances in influencing the structure and dynamics of migration. Their insight 
essentially builds on an earlier work by Stark (1999), and captures the viewpoint of a 
relatively high-skilled migrant who has an ulterior strategic motive in sending 
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remittances to a low-skilled migrant in the home country to subsidise the latterÕs 
ability to migrate. Stark argued that in the presence of asymmetric information and 
absence of screening by market participants, the first wave of migrants (who are 
assumed to be more entrepreneurial) could benefit from dissuading the low-skilled 
workers from migrating by sending them remittances to stay put. Based on this, the 
model predicted that the intention to migrate should be significantly lower among 
household members in remittance receiving households compared to those who donÕt 
receive remittances. Stark argued that in situations where migrantsÕ are heterogeneous 
and their productivity is observable, migrants may have an incentive to strategically 
use remittances to mould the beliefs of the employers and aim at negative selection of 
migrants. On the other hand, when employers in the host country use the average 
productivity of the group to determine the wage rate of migrant workers, migrants 
have the motive to bribe the potential migrants who are relatively unskilled to stay 
put.3 Within the logic of the strategic motive, these remittances would protect the 
wages of the highly skilled workers by entrenching their position in the labour 
market. Based on this, the model predicts that the intention to migrate will be 
significantly higher among individuals living in remittance-receiving households 
relative to non-recipient households. 
 
More recently, de Haas (2010) put forward a theoretical framework to explain the 
impact of remittances on migration. He draws attention away from the direct 
economic consequences of remittances to the non-pecuniary consequences such as 
their impact on inequality, education, gender empowerment including the impact on 
further migration. He argues that these underexposed second order effects of 
remittances transform the broader social, cultural and economic contexts in migrant-
sending communities which induces further migration. De Haas argues that besides 
the impact of remittances on social stratification and relative deprivation as well as 
the economic structure in sending communities, remittances from abroad have a third 
effect in the form of cultural and social change, which then has a reciprocal impact on 
the non-migrantÕs propensity to migrate in the future (see Fig 1).   
 
                                                              
3 This works under the assumption that the first cohort of migrants is relatively more skilled than the future cohorts. 
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Van Dalen et al (2005a) examine the effect of remittances on intentions of non-
migrant household members using data from Egypt, Turkey and Morocco. They use a 
large household survey conducted in 1996/1997 and restrict their sample to migrant 
households with no-return migrants on the grounds that the presence of return 
migrants in the household is likely to influence future migration decisions of other 
family members. Under these settings, Van Dalen et al use logistic regression to 
analyse the role of remittances in shaping emigration intentions of non-migrants. 
They show that for all three countries, remittances have a positive impact on 
intentions of non-migrant individuals. However, interestingly they find that the 
mechanisms behind the link differ across the three countries. While in Egypt and 
Turkey, the strength of the family ties between migrant and migrant-sending 
household determined emigration intentions, in Morocco remittances had a signalling 
effect of a chance of success in the destination country. Thus, in Egypt and Turkey 
migration intentions were part of a linked decision   ̶  those individuals who showed 
the greatest intent to migrate were either the spouses or children of former migrant 
members while in Morocco migration intentions were the result of the signalling 
property of remittances. 
 
Although the authors find positive results, it is important to highlight the 
shortcomings of the study. First, the dependent variable is just a simple question that 
asks the reference individual whether they want to migrate abroad or not. Using a 
variable without any indication of timing is less informative and is not a good proxy 
for the actual probability to migrate (Dustmann 2003; Van Dalen et al 2005b; Van 
Dalen and Henkens 2008). The second concern is that the study does not address 
potential endogeneity in the relationship between remittances and migration 
intentions. If there are omitted household characteristics that determine the likelihood 
of remittance receipts as well as the intentions to migrate, then this will substantially 
bias the estimated impact of remittances on migration intentions.  
 
Dimova and Wolff (2009) recognise the possibility of selection bias and take explicit 
account of it by employing a propensity score approach. They also account for 
unobserved heterogeneity by estimating random and fixed effect models. Moreover, 
unlike the former study they use a definite measure of migration potential to capture 
the migration intent of non-migrants. The question is - How likely do you think it is 
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that you will move abroad in the coming year: very likely, quite likely, not very 
likely, not likely at all? Thus it is equal to 1 if the answer is any of the first three 
options, and zero otherwise. Using data from Bosnia and Herzegovina the authors 
find that workers remittances from abroad contribute to net flows of emigration. In 
particular, they show that it is the young and highly educated who are most inclined to 
migrate, which suggests that the effect of remittances on the labour market and the 
entire economy might be negative as it may lead to a demographic imbalance and also 
shortage of human resources for the country. However, the authors do not 
differentiate between the relationship of remitters and the sending household and 
therefore between the mechanisms (i.e. whether remittances have a signalling effect 
or whether they are conditional on family ties). As a result, they are unable to identify 
the exact repercussions of the relationship on the nationÕs economy. 
 
Leeves (2009) investigates the effects of remittances on emigration intentions of 
households in Fiji and Tonga in 2005. Similar to the previous paper, the dependent 
variable is a dummy that asks individuals about specific plans to migrate in the next 
couple of years. The question asked was- Do you have any intentions to migrate 
abroad within the next couple of years? Like Van Dalen et al (2005a), households 
with any return migrants are not included in the sample. Furthermore, he controls for 
potential endogeneity by employing the instrumental variable (IV) approach. 4 
Endogeneity can arise and bias results if there are omitted household characteristics 
that determine both remittance receipt and migration intentions. However, in contrast 
to the earlier work, Leeves (2009) divides the sample by the householdÕs migration 
status and estimates the impact separately. Migrant households are defined as those 
who have migrant members abroad while non-migrant households are those who do 
not have any current migrants. Some non-migrant households also belong to 
remittance receiving household category. While migrant households receive 
remittances from family members/relative who are abroad, non-migrant households 
receive remittances from presumably friends and acquaintances. The results from the 
estimation show that remittances stimulate migration intentions in both Fiji and Tonga 
and that the impact of remittances is weaker for non-migrant households. In Fiji, the 
impact of remittances on intentions of individuals in non-migrant households is less 
                                                              
4 The instruments used in the current context relate to the altruistic motive of remittances. Previous research (Gubert, 2000; Yang 
and Martinez, 2006) has proved that remittances motivated by altruistic concerns are unlikely to influence longer-term plans for 
migration. 
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than a third of that in migrant households. This finding is consistent with their a priori 
hypothesis that the information content of remittances is weaker for non-migrant 
households as these flows arise from outside the household.  
 
While Leeves (2009) addresses most of the estimation issues, it has some limitations 
too. First, the instruments used to proxy remittances are not relevant for Fiji and 
Tonga, which may undermine the findings. For instance, the crop shock variable Ð a 
proxy for short-run income shocks Ð is not very efficient for small countries where 
there is no meaningful variation in the district economic and climatic conditions. 
Second, even though Leeves differentiates between migrant and non-migrant 
households, this information has not been utilised to shed light on the varying roles of 
remittances in perpetuating migration. On the contrary, the study assumes that 
remittances play similar roles in both household types and the impacts differ only in 
their intensity. 
 
4.3. Conceptual Framework 
4.3.1 Theory 
 
The idea that remittances play a role in perpetuating migration is at odds with the 
logic of the self-interest model wherein the receipt of remittances should dampen 
further emigration intentions of those left behind because these transfers soften the 
perceived income and insurance constraints of the household such that there is no 
need for additional members to migrate. Moreover, even the insurance contract model 
suggests that as long as the contract pays off it will sustain household members to live 
their lives in the country of origin (Van Dalen et al 2005a, 2005b). However, a few 
recent papers have explored the idea that remittances have a perpetuating effect on 
further migration of those left behind (Dimova and Wolff ,2009; Leeves, 2009). In 
this context, we analyse the role of these transfers on the future migration intentions 
of non-migrants in the source country. Using Moldovan data, we want to know if 
remittances from abroad have a trigger effect on future emigration intentions of non-
migrant individuals living in remittance-receiving households.  
 
Fig 2 provides a diagrammatic illustration of how remittances contribute to trigger 
migration intentions of individuals living in remittance receiving households. To 
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conduct such an analysis, non-migrants (those without any previous migration 
experience) are divided according to their respective migration-specific household 
status, i.e., those with one (other) migrant member and those without any migrant in 
the household. Thus, individuals from households with a current migrant are part of 
migrant households (category 1 in Fig 2) while those from households with no current 
migrant(s) belong to the second category (2 in Fig 2). The latter group is included on 
the basis that in ÔmatureÕ migration-and-remittances economies 5  (e.g. Moldova, 
Tonga etc.) it is common for non-migrant households to also receive remittances (see 
Roberts et al 2005; Cox-Edwards and Ureta 2003). For example, in Tonga, nearly 
80% of non-migrant households receive remittances while in Fiji, a less ÔmatureÕ 
migrant economy, almost 20 percent of households without migrants had received 
remittances (Brown, 2008). Individuals are further divided into categories by their 
intention to migrate  ̶  non-migrant members with no prior intentions to migrate in the 
future (links 1(A) and 2(A) in Fig 2) and those with prior intentions (1(B) and 2(B)). 
This division gives four categories shown in the figure as 1(A), 1(B), 2(A) and 2(B). 
 
As discussed previously, Stark and Wang (2002) were the first to conceptualise 
remittances as a stimulant of migration according to which remittances are one of the 
channels through which current migrants spur subsequent migration. They explain the 
link from the viewpoint of the emigrant who may have ulterior motives in sending 
remittances.6 However, the same link can also be explained from the perspective of 
the household members who are left behind (Van Dalen et al 2005a). Thus, for those 
without any prior intentions (in both migrant and non-migrant households), remittance 
receipts may signal comparative well-being in the host country which represents 
information on migration (investment) opportunities, thereby making non-migrants 
consider the possibility that migration is a profitable venture. As members of migrant 
households can also receive remittances from friends and ex-household members 
(apart from their own family members/relatives), it will be incorrect to assume that 
intentions are only determined by the strength of family ties. Therefore, in order to 
differentiate between the signalling property of remittances and remittances as a result 
                                                              
5 Economies where migration and remittance dependency has been long established and has become 
almost ubiquitous. 
6 This link cannot be tested in this paper as the data used was conducted in the country of origin and 
therefore does not contain detailed information about the migrant. Testing this link would require 
detailed information about the skill-set of the migrant as well as the recipient, in order to ensure that 
the recipient is lower skilled than the emigrant remitter. 
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of family ties, separate estimates using a variable that captures the strength of ties 
between the migrant and the household can be carried out. If remittances have a 
positive impact on intentions without the variable and if the inclusion of the variable 
neutralises this effect, it can be said that migration intentions of members of such 
households are only determined by strength of family ties. Alternatively, even if with 
the inclusion of the variable, remittances have a positive effect then migration 
intentions can be a result of both aspects. Therefore, it will then be reasonable to 
argue that it is not the signalling property of remittances that shape migration 
intentions of non-migrants living in such households. This situation is represented by 
link 1(A) and 2(A) in the diagram. 
 
Alternatively, a similar link can hold for individuals with prior intentions to migrate 
in the future. This is captured by modelling remittances as a function of prior 
intentions to migrate. Link 1(B) and 2(B) in the figure capture this causal relationship 
for non-migrant and migrant households respectively. As it can be seen in the 
diagram, there are two scenarios in which this relationship may hold for members of 
non-migrant households. First, when high migration costs of international migration 
impede members from migrating, receipt of remittances can help alleviate such credit 
constraints and thereby have a positive effect on future migration. Second, it can be 
explained in the context of a risk-diversifying arrangement between the migrant and 
the origin household. For instance, when the larger extended family bears the costs of 
migration of a potential migrant, an implicit part of the repayment may include 
helping other family members to migrate in the future (Ilahi and Jafarey 1999). Post 
migration, when the migrant repays the borrowed funds, these transfers cover the 
costs of migration of other family members who wish to migrate. However, once 
migration is established, the costs of migration for subsequent migrants are much 
lower due to the provision of support in the host country, which further encourages 
migration plans.  
 
For households with current migrants, the strength of family ties between the migrant 
and the sending household maybe the key mechanism that explains the positive 
impact on intentions to migrate. For instance, the spouse may have prior intentions to 
migrate and join the husband in the host country. As a result, the husband sends 
remittances to the spouse and these transfers help the spouse realise his/her intent. 
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The empirical analysis conducted in this paper draws upon the two main causal links 
shown and discussed earlier. On the one hand, as in Van Dalen et al (2005a), 
remittance receipts by origin households are modelled as a stimulant of migration 
intentions. On the other hand, they are specified as an outcome of prior migration 
intentions of non-migrants. In this set up, it is argued that there exists a reciprocal 
relationship between migration intentions of non-migrants and receipt of remittances 
i.e. incoming remittance flows stimulate migration intentions of non-migrants in the 
source country and, in its turn prior migration intentions affect the inflow of such 
transfers.  
 
4.3.2 Empirical Methodology 
 










   (2) 
 
where M denotes the future emigration intention of a non-migrant individual in the 
home country, R represents the householdÕs remittance status, CC controls for 
community characteristics, H is a vector of household characteristics, I captures 
individual characteristics of the non-migrant individual and Ȝ  is a normally 
distributed error term.  
The standard approach to modelling equations 1 and 2 is in a simultaneous equation 
framework where migration intentions and remittances are the joint endogenous 
variables. The general form of a system with g simultaneous equations can be written 
as: 
!!! ! !!!! ! !!!           (3) 
 
where Y is a (g x 1) vector of endogenous variables, X is a (k x 1) vector of 
predetermined, exogenous variables and e is the  (g x 1) residualÕs vector. C is the (g 
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x g) matrix of coefficients of the endogenous variables and B is the (g x k) matrix of 
coefficients for the predetermined variables. The errors of the model are normally 
distributed with an unknown but finite co-variance matrix. The simultaneity in the 
variables is resolved by transforming the system from the structural form (3) to the 






!!       (4) 
 
Assuming !!!! ! ! and !!!!! ! !!, we get 
                                     
!! ! !!!!! ! !!!                                           (5) 
 
As we can see from equation 5, the resultant reduced form specifies the endogenous 
variables as explicit coefficients of the exogenous variables and thereby eliminates the 
simultaneity. However, to estimate the model the system has to be identified. The 
rank and order conditions (Greene, 2008) and/or other non-sample information such 
as exclusions and linear restrictions and restrictions on the disturbance covariance 
matrix help identify the model. We rely on the exclusion restrictions.7 Since migration 
intentions and remittances are the joint endogenous variables we need at least two 
instruments. Following this, the first instrument should be highly correlated with 
migration intentions of the non-migrant and uncorrelated with the probability to 
receive remittances and vice-versa for the second instrument. 
 
We proxy migration intentions using Òmigration rateÓ in the sending region. It is 
argued that individuals living in areas with greater prevalence of migration are more 
likely to develop migration intentions as these migration networks help lower 
migration costs (both monetary and psychological) which then has a positive effect on 
migration. The use of migration rate has been widely employed in the literature. 
Quisumbing and McNiven (2010) use percentage of migrants from other households 
in the village to instrument for migration in rural Philippines.  Similarly, Taylor and 
Lopez- Feldman (2010) use a similar measure for rural households in Mexico.8 Based 
on this we employ a categorical variable which captures the rate of migration in 
                                                              
7 We use this condition because otherwise the rank will be less than k (the number of unknown parameters) and the model will be 
under-identified. 
8 They use a dummy variable that takes the value of one if other households in the village had migrants abroad. 
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Moldova. We gather information on this variable from the Quarterly Labour Force 
Survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics. The variable highlights the 
migration prevalence in different districts of Moldova. The LFS defines migration 
prevalence as the number of migrants per 100 residents, between the ages of 18 and 
64 and classifies them into three broad categories: high, medium and low migration 
prevalence.  Thus, a district with high migration prevalence is one that has more than 
25 migrants per 100 residents. Similarly, districts with 10-25 migrants and less than 
10 migrants belong to medium and low migration prevalence districts respectively. 
The variable turns out as a good proxy for intentions to migrate with the rate of 
correlation with receipt of remittances being insignificant. 
 
We use information on bank account to instrument the remittance variable. Previous 
studies have shown that in Moldova, the share of remittances sent via formal channels 
(bank services) has been on the rise (Sander et al, 2005). Also, other evidence based 
on the report by the National Bank of Moldova (2004), shows that the amount of 
remittances sent through formal channels almost doubled in a span of three years 
(from US$232.6 million in 2001 to US$401.5 million in 2004). Drawing on this 
information, we argue that if the household member working abroad has a bank or 
postal account, it increases the householdÕs probability to receive remittances because 
it makes transferring money easier. On the other hand, the correlation between having 
a bank account and intention to migrate is 0.0005.  
 
Given our hypothesis on the relationship between remittances and migration 
intentions, we can assume that there is a correlation between equations, hence the 
covariance matrix will not be diagonal and therefore 3SLS/SURE is the most 
appropriate estimation method. This econometric procedure accounts for both the 
simultaneity between the endogenous variables as well as the contemporaneous 
correlation between the disturbance terms.  
 
Thus, our model consists of two endogenous equations: one equation represents the 
migration intentions of the non-migrant household members (equation 6), and the 
other equation represents the likelihood of receipt of remittances by the non-migrants 
(equation 7). We estimate these equations in a two-equation system to investigate the 
degree of correlation between migration intentions and receipt of remittances.  
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Migration Intentionsij = A0+ A1Rec_Remit +A2Migration_rate + A3hh_size + 
A4Network + A5Affluent + A6Urban + A7Trust + A8Edu_mem 
+A9Female + A10 Age +A11Unemployed + Eij                   (6)  
  
Rec_Remit = B0+ B1Intentions +B2Bank_Account + B3hh_size + B4Network + 
B5Affluent +B6Urban+B7NELM +B8Edu_mem +B9Female + B10Age 
+B11Unemployed + Uij                                                                 (7)    
where Intentions is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent states that he wants 
to migrate abroad in the near future, 0 otherwise; Rec_Remit equals 1 if the 
respondent lives in a household that had received remittances from abroad in the  
twelve months prior to the survey and 0 otherwise ; hh_size is the number of members 
in the household; Network equals 1 if the respondent knows people abroad; Affluent 
measures the wealth status of the household  based on information on the householdÕs 
ownership of property; Urban equals 1 if the household resides in an urban area and 0 
otherwise; Trust measures the trust of individuals in the financial institutions of the 
country and therefore can be used as a proxy for the individualÕs perception of the 
economic environment of the country; Edu_mem is the individualÕs education level; 
Female equals 1 if the respondent is a female and 0 if male; Age is the individualÕs 
age in years; Unemployed equals 1 if the individual is unemployed and 0 otherwise; 
Migration rate  is a categorical variable that is indicative of the rate of migration in 
the area the respondent resides in ; Bank_Account equals 1 if the migrant has a bank 
or postal account abroad and 0 otherwise. Eij and Uij are the error terms. 
4. Data and Sample Description 
The data used in this paper comes from a survey conducted by Swedish International 
Development Agency (SIDA) and International Organisation for Migration between 
June and August 2006. The aim of the survey was to study the impact of migration 
and remittances on Moldovan households. It builds upon and updates a similar survey 
first conducted in 2004 (though it so not longitudinal). It also complements migration 
data available from the quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS) (carried out by the 
National Bureau of Statistics) and the Balance of Payments information on 
remittances (provided by the National Bank of Moldova, NBM). 
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The survey implements a multi-stage sampling design and thus is representative of all 
Moldovan households. The survey methodology involves administering questions to 
only those households where migrants returned after January 1st 2005. If a migrant 
returned before January 2005, the case was not studied, just registered. Given this, a 
total number of 3940 households were interviewed. Out of this, 25% of the 
households report as having at least one current or ex-household member currently 
working abroad, compared to 22.5% in 2004.9 Moreover 30% of the households 
report that they received remittances in the 12 months prior to the survey interview 
date.  The migration contingent, defined as those individuals who have plans to go 
abroad in the future was 10.6% in 2006 relative to 8.3% in 2004. Although not all of 
these individuals may actually migrate abroad, this finding reflects the growing 
importance of labour migration as an option for Moldovans. Thus, in view of the 
significant flow of migrants and intentions of a large proportion of those still in the 
country, exploring the link between the receipt of remittances and the possible trigger 
of further migration of non-migrants seems quite important. 
 
For the purpose of the survey, one member of the remittance-receiving household was 
asked about other household members including those living abroad. In 95% of the 
cases, the head of the household answered the questions. The household head is asked 
about each individual memberÕs relevant background information such as age, gender, 
marital status, education, labour-market experience (primary and secondary 
occupation). Information was also provided about other household related questions, 
such as: households perceived income status, household size, ownership of assets, and 
trust in the institutions of Moldova etc. For households who have a migrant, detailed 
information about the year of migration, problems and costs faced during migration, 
living and working conditions, legal status in the destination country, further 
intentions, frequency and amount of money or goods sent home by the migrants, the 
effect of remittances on household welfare and use of remittances were also recorded.  
We identify two key questions in the survey that form the basis of the analysis.  
Do you receive monetary remittances from abroad? ; and 
                                                              
9 A  household member  is  considered  a migrant  if,  at  the  time  of  the  interview,  the member  is 
temporarily absent, i.e. “staying abroad to work or look for work”.!
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Do you have any intentions to migrate abroad in the near future?  
Both questions take the value of one if the answer is affirmative and zero otherwise. 
While remittances are measured at the household level, the intentions are reported at 
the individual level. As mentioned before, we use stated emigration intentions to 
proxy future emigration decisions of the non-migrant. De Jong et al (1996) shows that 
in Thailand, the intention to migrate is a powerful predictor of actual migration. In 
fact, Van Dalen and Henkens (2008) find that forces that trigger emigration intentions 
are also the same that make people actually migrate. Also, Gardner et al (1986: 70) 
present some evidence from Philippines that shows that potential (international) 
migrants who were unable to realise their intentions were mainly thwarted by legal 
hurdles. Thus, intentions to migrate abroad seem to reflect willingness to respond to 
opportunities in the realisation that such opportunities may be few and far between 
and may disappear rapidly. 
 
Following Van Dalen, Groenwold, and Fokkema (2005a), households that included a 
return migrant were dropped from the sample, as these return migrants are likely to 
influence decisions of others and also, return migrantsÕ themselves have a higher 
probability to migrate again. Furthermore, we restrict our analysis to individuals 
between the ages of 18 and 65 living in households that do not contain return 
migrants.10 It is also important to mention that as the data set contained a lot of 
missing observations due to the rate of non-response being quite high, it was cleaned 
for the missing information and anomalies. After all the exclusions, we obtain our 
final sample by constructing a data set where each individual in the household is 
counted as one observation. Thus our main sample consists of 5394 individuals with 
no prior migration experience.  
Even though the use of intention data to predict future behaviour is often used (Van 
Dalen et al 2005b; Yang 2000; Leeves 2009), it is important to recognise and be 
cautious of the problems of misreporting. First, the measure of intentions (i.e. answer 
to the question asked) is of key importance in drawing accurate predictions of 
behaviour. For instance, when predicting intentions to Ômigrate abroadÕ, it is 
                                                              
10 Individuals below the age of 18 are excluded from the sample on the assumption that they do not 
take decisions on moving abroad on their own. 
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important to ensure that intentions relating to Ômigrate abroadÕ and no intentions to 
ÔmigrateÕ are being analysed.  In the same vein, the framing of the questions in the 
survey (i.e. whether the question is open-ended or a Ôforced-choiceÕ question) are 
important determinants of the information quality. While a general intention to 
migrate without any time bound is definitely less informative as intentions may 
change over time not necessarily because of a change in preferences but mainly due to 
changes in circumstances and change in expectations, there exists ample empirical 
evidence to prove that time-bounded questions on positive migration intention turn 
out as good proxies of the actual probability to migrate. In the present survey, the 
respondent is asked about his intentions over the next 12 months thereby minimising 
the problem. Moreover, the measure of intention is specific to the behaviour of 
interest and is not open-ended. 
 
Besides these two variables, a mixture of individual and household based variables 
that approximate theoretical concepts are often used in migration intention and 
remittances theory. Some of these variables are reported at individual level (age, 
gender) while others are reported at the household level (wealth status, household 
size). These variables are divided into three broad categories capturing household, 
individual and community level characteristics. 
 
Household Characteristics 
Household characteristics include wealth status of the household, connections abroad 
and its size and location. As information on the income of the household was 
unavailable in the survey, information on ownership of property is used to construct a 
household wealth-score index. Based on this, two broad categories are created Ð 
affluent  ̶  if a household owns an apartment/ house and more than 1.5 hectares of 
land  ̶  and non-affluent. Wealth can either have a negative or positive impact on 
migration intentions. As wealth is a much more stable indicator of the financial status 
than income, it is likely to be strongly related to migration intentions. Affluent 
households may have the resources to fund migration, which could promote 
migration. However, it may have a negative effect too as it could easily be a reason to 
stay at home.  
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Similar to the wealth index, the impact of household size on future intentions is also 
ambiguous. While larger households imply stronger networks hence stronger 
intentions, such households also require more funds for bearing the costs of additional 
family members. In addition, a dummy variable identifying whether the household is 
urban or rural based is also included in the analysis. Research has shown that the 
intention to migrate is strongly related to the area the household resides in (Van Dalen 
et al 2005a; Leeves 2009; Dimova & Wolff 2009). On the one hand, urban 
households are more open to migration as they have better access and more 
information hence are more likely to want to migrate. On the other hand, rural 
households have a great propensity to migrate to overcome market failures specific to 
their location and a higher dependency ratio. 
 
There is a general consensus on the role of social networks abroad as drivers of 
further migration. Such contacts in the destination country are important as they lower 
the costs of adjustment (both monetary and psychological) for potential migrants 
(Massey et al, 1998). Thus, individuals with existing contacts abroad are more open 
to migration than those without. 
 
Individual Characteristics 
Individual characteristics include the age, education level, employment status and 
gender of the non-migrant. In general, younger people have stronger intentions to 
migrate due to a combination of human capital and life course hypothesis. As their 
level of human capital is generally higher than migrants from older cohorts and 
because the payback period for the loans incurred to fund migration is longer, the net 
benefits of migration are more likely to be positive. In addition, their stock of local 
social capital is lower because of which they are less bound by family ties and social 
environments, which decreases the psychological costs associated with moving. These 
reasons together have a significantly positive impact on their migration decision.  
 
According to the theory of self-selection, increased years of education are associated 
with greater intentions to migrate, as the expected returns in the host country are 
higher. Existing research (Liebig and Sousa-Pozo 2004; Fourage and Ester; 2008) 
shows education level to be a strong determinant of migration intentions. We also 
control for the employment status of the potential migrant. While the unemployed are 
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more likely to exhibit stronger migration intentions than the employed as the need to 
migrate is relatively lower for the latter, it does not imply that only the unemployed 
migrate i.e. unemployment is not a necessary condition. Finally, gender differences in 
mobility intentions reflect the structure of society in an economy. In most cases, fewer 
women than men report intentions to migrate to another country. 
 
Community Characteristics 
Following Sana and Massey (2005) and Durand et al (1996), we also control for the 
economic environment in the home country. We construct a cumulative measure of 
the trust in the different financial institutions (FI) like banks, micro-financial 
agencies, saving associations and post offices.11 This variable is a proxy for efficient 
economic environment in the country, which may have a negative impact on future 
out-migration, especially if the main motive of migration is to overcome credit 
constraints in the home country. 
 
Table 2 provides a full description of the variables used in the empirical analysis. It 
also reports the mean values of the main sample along with the mean values by 
migrant status. Thus, column 1 of Table 2 provides the mean values for the whole 
sample while column 2 and 3 do so for non-migrant (3996 individuals) and migrant 
(1398) households, respectively. As discussed in section 3 above, an individual 
belongs to a migrant household if at the time of the survey the household had a 
current migrant. Individuals from households without any current migrant are part of 
the non-migrant households.  
 
While it is common for individuals in migrant households to receive remittances, it 
has been shown that in countries with strong migration networks it is common for 
non-migrant households to receive remittances too. For example, Cox-Edwards and 
Ureta (2003) show that 14 percent of rural and 15 percent of urban households in El 
Salvador who did not have any current migrants abroad received remittances from 
friends and distant relatives. Similarly, in Armenia relatively large values of transfers 
are remitted by distant relatives or friends from the West (Roberts 2004). Therefore, 
limiting the analysis to migrant households is likely to underestimate the impact of 
                                                              
11 If the person responded that he trusted more than two financial institutions then that household was labelled as having trust in 
the institutions of the home country.  
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remittances. As we can see from the table, over 50% of the migrant households 
compared to only 6% of non-migrant households receive remittances.  The large 
difference might be attributed to the fact that non-migrant households receive 
remittances from friends, distant relatives and ex-household members who are not 
bound by any ÔdutyÕ to send transfers, or maybe they do not know any migrants at all. 
Another advantage of dividing households by migration status is that it helps 
differentiate between different potential mechanisms at work - in particular, it may 
help to capture the signalling effect of remittances. As remitters to non-migrant 
households are less likely to be family members, it is reasonable to assume that it is 
the signalling property of remittances that triggers migration intentions of individuals 
in such households. 
 
The other noticeable difference between the two groups are in terms of networks in 
the host country with 71 percent of migrant household members reporting that they 
know friends and family abroad compared to only 61 percent of non-migrant 
household members. This clearly provides some evidence on the migration-
facilitating role of networks in Moldova. Moreover, among the individual level 
variables we find that non-migrant members of migrant households are marginally 
less educated compared to the migrant. This reflects the pattern of migration in 
Moldova, where lower levels of education of non-migrants capture the fact that 
Moldovan migrants are positively self-selected. Furthermore, women are over-
represented in migrant households than non-migrant households, probably because 
they are left at home. Also, a greater proportion of migrant households are rural-
based, thereby providing some evidence that one of the objectives of migration of 
Moldovans is to overcome market failure. 
 
It is also instructive to look at Tables 3a and 3b which gives a breakdown of mobility 
intentions and remittances by household and individual characteristics respectively. It 
can be seen that the profiles of those who receive remittances and those who express a 
desire to migrate abroad are quite similar. The results show that the wealthy are more 
likely to express a desire to migrate and at the same time are more likely to receive 
remittances. We also find that educated people are slightly more likely to receive 
transfers and that they have a higher chance of migrating.  
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5. Results 
Given the dearth of research on the role of remittances in triggering migration, the 
current paper aims to analyse this link using a simultaneous equations model and 
allowing for the possibility of a causal relationship between receipt of remittances and 
migration intentions. In doing so, the analysis takes into account the feedback effects 
between the two variables and presents a complete impact of remittances on future 
migration.  
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the non-migrant population of working age 
(18-65 years) in Moldova; all coefficient estimates are reported as marginal effects. 
The model is estimated for three separate samples, conditional on a set of exogenous 
variables. Column 1 presents the estimates for the whole sample while column 2 and 
3 show the estimates for members of non-migrant and migrant households 
respectively. Looking at the estimates it is clear that all three samples confirm to the 
central hypothesis with regard to the reciprocity in the relationship between receipt of 
remittances and migration intentions of non-migrants in the home country. 
 The results show that remittance receipts have a significantly positive effect on 
migration intentions and prior migration intentions significantly increase the 
likelihood of receiving remittances from abroad. For the whole sample, it is observed 
that receipt of remittances stimulates migration intentions of those left behind by 
9.5% and those individuals who have prior plans to migrate abroad in the near future 
are 18% more likely to receive remittances. The use of 3SLS estimation is helpful in 
disentangling the effect of remittances from the effect of prior intentions. 
Columns (2) and (3) give a deeper insight of the mechanisms in play. On drawing the 
mechanisms, the paper draws upon the diagrammatic illustration presented in Fig 2 
above. 
5.1 Impact of Remittances on Migration Intentions (Links 1(A) and 2(A)) 
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 show that the effect of remittances on migration 
intentions is stronger for members of non-migrant households. Remittance receipts 
increase migration intentions by 14.9 percent compared to an insignificant impact for 
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members of migrant households. These estimates indicate that the impact of 
remittances on intentions is significantly under-estimated in standard probit estimates 
with the marginal effects upto 60% greater compared to the model where endogeneity 
is taken into account (Leeves, 2009). This implies that as migration networks get 
stronger, remittances have greater influence on migration intentions. Moreover, as 
discussed in section 3.1, this evidence supports the hypothesis that remittances have a 
signalling property, which spurs the migration process. 
For the other control variables, some consistent findings emerge. In accordance with 
earlier work (De Jong, 1996; Puri and Ritzema, 1999; Van Dalen et al, 2005a,b) the 
profile of a person with high emigration intentions (for all the three samples) is that of 
a young unemployed male with networks in the host country. Stronger migration 
intentions are held by the unemployed as compared to the employed supports the view 
that migration from Moldova is needs driven. Moreover, as the employed already 
have a secure economic position, the need to migrate is relatively lower hence the 
weaker intentions (Fourage and Ester, 2007). Besides, as Van Dalen et al (2005b) 
note, migration offers the unemployed an alternative route to gainful employment, 
therefore, it is associated with stronger intentions. Furthermore, females have less 
strong intentions to migrate than males. Also, individuals with greater human capital 
are more likely to express an intention to migrate. Educated individuals are 79 percent 
more likely to express intentions to migrate than the relatively less educated, which 
provides some evidence of positive self-selection in the migration process and 
evidence of the brain drain hypothesis. 
The results in Table 4 suggest that the wealth status of the household has a negative 
impact on the migration intentions of individuals. Furthermore, network effects are 
quite significant. One explanation for this result is that perhaps they tend to lessen 
both monetary and psychological costs of moving and hence encourage stronger 
intentions to migrate. 
5.2 Impact of Prior Migration Intentions on Remittance Receipts (Links 1(B) and  
2(B)) 
Table 4 suggests that prior migration intentions also have a positive impact on the 
receipt of remittances. Focusing on the second half of Table 4, the effect is 
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particularly significant for non-migrant households and insignificant for migrant 
households. Intentions to migrate abroad increases the likelihood of receiving 
remittances by 10.5 percent. Consistent with the discussion in section 3.1, this 
suggests that in Moldova family ties do not determine remittance receipts (i.e. no 
support for link 2(B) in our theoretical framework). In fact, this lends support to the 
idea that remittances might be alleviating credit constraints of households, which 
might have prevented them from migrating. Alternatively, it can also be argued that 
these transfers are an outcome of a mutually beneficial contract between the migrant 
and the individual in the home country, which involves helping the latter move 
abroad. 
It is interesting to note that a mixture of household and individual characteristics 
determines the receipt of remittances. Individuals with the highest likelihood of 
receiving remittances come from a large (in terms of number of members) but not so 
wealthy households. Both these results suggest that remittances have a liquidity-
easing component to them. Presence of networks in the host country and trust in the 
economic environment in the home country have a significantly positive impact on 
the probability to receive remittances. Trust in the financial institutions of the home 
country is an indication of the local communityÕs economic climate and thus business 
opportunities. Similarly, networks in the host country are likely to reduce assimilation 
costs in the host country and hence indirectly may have a positive effect on the 
likelihood of receipt of remittances.  
The findings of the research are supplemented by carrying out separate estimation on 
a sample split by the householdÕs wealth status. The rationale behind the division is to 
isolate the credit constraint effect from the signalling effect. As individuals from 
affluent households are less likely to be constrained, it can be argued that a positive 
effect of remittances on intentions would support the idea that remittances carry 
information of economic well-being of migrants in the host country.  On the other 
hand, a positive impact of remittances on intentions for individuals from relatively 
poorer (non-affluent) households would be consistent with the liquidity-easing role of 
such transfers. Table 5 presents the results for individuals in affluent and Ônon-
affluentÕ households. It can be clearly seen that remittances have a significantly 
positive impact in both cases. The receipt of remittances appears to increase migration 
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intentions by more than 10% (7%) for affluent (non-affluent) households. This 
suggests that remittances have both a signalling property as well as the potential to 
help overcome credit constraints. 
The impact of other explanatory variables remain unchanged across the two samples 
with a few exceptions. Comparing the impact across the two samples, we see that 
each additional year of education increases migration intentions of individuals from 
affluent households by four times more than it affects those from non-affluent 
households. This is in line with much of the previous literature where in the presence 
of signalling, highly educated are the most likely to emigrate. While as remittances 
relax credit constraints in non‐affluent households, the education level of individualÕs 
does not have any significant impact on intentions. Moreover, the household size has 
a significantly negative impact on the migration intentions of individuals from non-
affluent households. As members of such households have limited resources, 
migration of additional family members would strain the householdÕs financial 
resources even more, thereby discouraging migration intentions. In addition to this, 
unemployed individuals in affluent households are more likely to express intentions to 
migrate relative to unemployed in non-affluent households as the incoming transfers 
signal financial gains in the host country for the former. Furthermore, as expected, 
efficient financial institutions in the home country have a significant negative impact 
on migration intentions of individuals in wealthy households.  
Thus, to recapitulate we show that remittances perform the signalling function in 
Moldova that has a positive impact on migration intentions of non-migrants. We also 
find evidence to support that prior migration intentions might be the reason some 
individuals receive remittances. So it might be that remittances are part of an implicit 
contract between the migrant and the origin household where the migrant helps the 
members of the origin household to migrate abroad and remittances are used as loans 
for these members to cover the costs of migration (see Ilahi and Jafarey, 1999). This 
link is also consistent in the context of credit constraints where remittances are a 




5.3 Extensions and Robustness Checks                              
In order to ensure the validity of the results, an additional robustness check is carried 
out by re-estimating the model by gender. Results presented in Table 6 show that they 
are consistent with the previous results,  i.e., the coefficient of the remittance variable 
is still significantly positive, implying that remittances stimulate future migration 
intentions in Moldova. Also, the causality between remittances and future migration 
intentions holds. 
In summary, the findings from all the specifications support the hypothesis that 
remittances have a positive impact on future migration intentions. Based on the 
findings it can be said that the receipt of remittances trigger migration of additional 
members and thus strengthens the phenomenon of chain migration. The results 
support two main mechanisms underlying this link Ð signalling effect and credit 
constraint reliever.  
 
6. Conclusion  
The aim of this paper was to explore the potential influence of remittances in 
perpetuating migration intentions of non-migrants in Moldova. In doing so, the paper 
employed a large household survey data and analysed the mechanisms through which 
remittances trigger further migration of those left behind. Previous literature has 
argued that remittances spur the migration process by providing non-migrants with 
the financial resources and information about the host country thus signalling to them 
that it is beneficial to migrate. However, unlike much of the literature the current 
research argues that receipt of remittances is a function of non-migrantÕs prior 
intentions to migrate. More specifically, remittances and migration intentions are 
allowed to simultaneously affect each other and this relationship is modelled in a 
simultaneous equation framework. The analysis aims to help uncover the 
unconventional impacts of remittances on the home country and contributes to the 
better understanding of the relationship between the migration intentions of non-
migrants and remittances.  
The estimations suggest a reciprocal relationship between the receipt of remittances 
and migration intentions of those left behind. In particular, evidence that remittances 
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from migrants to non-migrant households in the home country have a signalling 
effect, which enhances non-migrants aspirations and encourages migration intentions. 
Further, the results show that remittances alleviate liquidity constraints of the 
recipients. As high costs of migration and low access to credit markets impede 
migration of some members of the household, remittances help overcome these credit 
constraints and thereby have a positive impact on migration. Another interesting 
result that emerges from the analysis is the difference in the effect of remittances on 
individuals in migrant and non-migrant households. It is seen that the impact of 
remittances on intentions is only significant for non-migrant households and 
insignificant for migrant households, thereby highlighting the fact that remittances are 
not determined by the strength of family ties in Moldova. 
In terms of policy relevance, the findings can help policy makers and governments to 
better understand and predict the effects of international remittances on the source 
country. For example, earlier findings that migration and remittances work in same 
way as official development assistance for less-developed countries might not hold 
anymore. Also, as it is the young who have the greatest inclination to migrate it may 
lead to demographic imbalance, as migration increases and migrant networks 
strengthen even more. Therefore, it is essential for the government to initiate some 
long-term reforms to break the chain of migration. One way of doing this is by 
improving the economic conditions of the home country which might reduce an 
individualÕs intentions to migrate in the future. Creation of domestic jobs is essential 
to counter the continuous emigration of workers. Better work opportunities at home 
will deter individuals from migrating thereby diminishing the signalling effect of 
remittances. The results from the analysis also suggest that it is the unemployed that 
express stronger intentions to migrate. State unemployment programmes, which 
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Fig 1: The Remittance Syndrome -Second Order Feedbacks 
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Household Size No of people living in household 3.862 3.783 4.08 
Affluent Household 
=1 If  hh owns 1 or more apartment/house + 
more than 1.5 hectares of land; 0 otherwise 
.326 .328 .320 




=1 if respondent answers that he is 
unemployed 
.135 .133 .140 
Trust 
=1 if the individual trusts the economic 
environment in Moldova 
.255 .238 .304 
Female IndividualÕs gender (male=0) .535 .534 .537 
Education IndividualÕs education (in years) 14.899 14.940 14.770 
Existence of social 
network 
=1 if has networks abroad, 0 otherwise .643 .616 .718 
Age IndividualÕs age (in years) 40.950 39.890 43.920 
Bank Account 
=1 if migrant has a bank/postal account 
abroad 
0.018 .009 .042 
N No. of observations 5394 3996 1398 
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Table 3(a): Individual  Characteristics  by  stated  emigration  
































 Yes No 
Household Size 3.953 3.656 
Affluent .3283 .3255 
Area .4583 .3604 
Unemployed .1898 .1641 
Trust .2847 .2462 
Female .4652 .5435 
Education 15.37 14.38 





 Yes No 
Household Size 4.124 3.592 
Affluent .3121 .3283 
Area .3339 .3731 
Unemployed .2265 .1544 
Trust .4306 .2148 
Female .5439 .5372 
Education 14.41 14.45 
Social network .7578 .6029 
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Table 4: Estimates for Non-migrants by their household migration status 
(marginal effects) 
     (1) (2) (3) 
 All-Households Non-Migrant Migrant 
Migration Intentions 
 
   
Receive Remittances 0.0957*** 0.149*** 0.0119 
 (9.85) (8.06) (0.74) 
Migration Rate 0.0282*** 0.0225** 0.0359** 
 
Household Characteristics 
(4.58) (3.22) (2.82) 
Wealth Status -0.0221** -0.0154 -0.0461* 
 (-2.60) (-1.66) (-2.39) 
Area (Urban=1) 0.0391*** 0.0260** 0.078*** 
 (4.51) (2.76) (3.87) 
Household Size -0.00532 -0.00273 -0.0068 
 
Individual Characteristics 
(-1.91) (-0.87) (-1.17) 
Age -0.00297*** -0.00228*** -0.004** 
 (-11.40) (-7.80) (-7.97) 
Gender (Female=1) -0.0303*** -0.0357*** -0.0180 
 (-4.31) (-4.62) (-1.16) 
Education Level 0.00950** 0.00798* 0.0161* 
 (2.67) (2.03) (2.05) 
Employment Status(Ref=Unemployed) 0.0272** 0.0191 0.0462* 
 
Community Characteristics 
(2.64) (1.67) (2.05) 
Networks Abroad (yes=1) 0.0314*** 0.0311*** 0.0375* 
 (4.25) (3.90) (2.16) 
Trust 0.000510 -0.00277 0.0175 
 (0.06) (-0.27) (0.93) 
Receive Remittances 
 
   
Migration Intentions 0.183*** 0.105*** 0.0267 
 (9.80) (7.93) (0.60) 
Bank Account (yes=1) 0.397*** 0.283*** 0.218** 
 
Household Characteristics 
(10.48) (8.11) (3.24) 
Wealth Status -0.0000534 -0.0191* -0.0015 
 (-0.00) (-2.44) (-0.05) 
Area (Urban=1) -0.00442 0.0172* 0.0232 
 (-0.38) (2.26) (0.70) 
Household Size 0.0327*** 0.00685** 0.0428*** 
 
Individual Characteristics 
(8.57) (2.59) (4.42) 
Age 0.00288*** 0.0000660 0.00167 
 (8.00) (0.27) (1.76) 
Gender (Female=1) 0.0122 0.00893 0.00632 
 (1.25) (1.37) (0.24) 
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Education Level -0.0124* -0.00851* -0.0028 
 (-2.52) (-2.56) (-0.22) 
Employment Status(Ref=Unemployed) 0.00219 0.00550 -0.0162 
 
Community Characteristics 
(0.15) (0.57) (-0.43) 
Networks Abroad (yes=1) 0.0830*** 0.0331*** 0.110*** 
 (8.18) (4.93) (3.82) 
Trust 0.132*** 0.0685*** 0.209*** 
 (10.77) (8.07) (6.76) 
Observations 5394 3996 1398 
Notes: Wealth Status: A household is considered ÒaffluentÕ if it owns an apartment/land, vehicle. 
ÔTrustÕ measures the level of trust individuals have in the countryÕs economic institutions.  t statistics in 


























Table 5: Estimates by Wealth Status 
 
 (1) (2) 




Receive Remittances 0.129*** 0.0805*** 
 (7.48) (6.84) 




Area (Urban=1) 0.0497*** 0.0352** 
 (3.33) (3.27) 




Age -0.00236*** -0.00332*** 
 (-5.18) (-10.44) 
Gender (Female=1) -0.0169 -0.0362*** 
 (-1.36) (-4.25) 
Education Level 0.0190** 0.00493 
 (3.11) (1.12) 




Networks Abroad (yes=1) 0.0289* 0.0322*** 
 (2.17) (3.63) 
Trust -0.0270 0.0126 




Migration Intentions 0.246*** 0.153*** 
 (7.65) (6.67) 




Area (Urban=1) 0.0215 -0.0222 
 (1.13) (-1.52) 




Age 0.00297*** 0.00298*** 
 (4.78) (6.72) 
Gender (Female=1) 0.00390 0.0148 
 (0.23) (1.25) 
Education Level -0.0368*** 0.000156 
 (-4.45) (0.03) 






Networks Abroad (yes=1) 0.0649*** 0.0864*** 
 (3.58) (7.06) 
Trust 0.110*** 0.144*** 
 (5.17) (9.60) 
Observations 1757 3637 
Notes: A household is considered ÔaffluentÕ if it owns an 
apartment/land, vehicle. t statistics in parentheses; * p < 




Table 6: Estimates by Gender 
 (1) (2) 




Receive Remittances 0.121*** 0.0649*** 
 (10.08) (4.13) 




Wealth Status -0.0124 -0.0335* 
 (-1.16) (-2.48) 
Area (Urban=1) 0.0440*** 0.0331* 
 (4.05) (2.40) 




Age -0.00256*** -0.00344*** 
 (-7.75) (-8.37) 
Education Level 0.00711 0.0141* 
 (1.63) (2.41) 




Networks Abroad (yes=1) 0.0276** 0.0361** 
 (3.01) (3.06) 
Trust -0.0104 0.0143 




Migration Intentions 0.284*** 0.101*** 
 (10.16) (4.02) 




Wealth Status -0.00394 0.00172 
 (-0.24) (0.10) 
Area (Urban=1) -0.0109 0.00205 
 (-0.69) (0.12) 




Age 0.00256*** 0.00313*** 
 (5.07) (6.04) 
Education Level -0.0171** -0.00627 
 (-2.59) (-0.85) 






Networks Abroad (yes=1) 0.0801*** 0.0847*** 
 (5.77) (5.72) 
Trust 0.135*** 0.130*** 
 (8.09) (7.14) 
Observations 2885 2509 
Notes: A household is considered ÔaffluentÕ if it owns an 
apartment/land, vehicle. t statistics in parentheses;  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
  
 
 
